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Abstract 
I discuss some key issues raised by behavioral economics for better understanding the 
working of the labor market. Amongst the key points in this paper are: (i) a revised modeling 
of the labor supply curve, with a specific focus on the target income approach (ii) elaborating 
on the importance of effort variability for understanding labor supply, including a narrative on 
efficiency wage and x-efficiency theory (includes the importance of fairness) (iii) building 
upon x-efficiency and efficiency wage theory to better understand the demand side of the 
labor market (iv) discussing some of the cognitive/informational/institutional factors affecting 
decision-making, including modeling the role of errors or biases in labor market decisions for 
both the supply and demand side of the labor market (v) insights of experimental economics 
for labor market behavior (vi) the importance behavioral economics for better understanding 
the stylizing facts of labor markets. This paper also compares conventional to behavioral 
theoretical approaches labor markets, their different underlying assumptions, and analytical 
predictions, with implications for public policy and institutional design. Also compared are 
the errors and biases and the bounded rationality approaches labor market analysis. They 
produce different analytical predictions as well as having different implications for public 
policy and institutional design. 
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Keywords: Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, efficiency wages, effort discretion, 
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  The author thanks Bruce Kaufman, Morris Kleiner, and Louise Lamontagne and for their 
many helpful comments and suggestions. Also thanks to the comments from participants of 
the January 2013 Allied Social Science Association meeting session on labor markets in San 
Diego, where this paper was presented. A version of this paper is forthcoming in, Bruce 
Kaufman, ed. Models of Labor Markets. Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press.	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1 Introduction  
In this chapter, building upon and adding to the standard economics toolbox, I interrogate 
some of the contributions of behavioral economics to modeling both the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market. I also discuss some of the implications of this for analytical 
prediction, cause and effect analysis, and public policy. In this more focused review of the 
literature, taking a more pluralistic approach, I analyze the target theory of labor supply, 
where the supply of labor is a function of an individual’s target income.2 In the standard 
model labor supply is product of the wage rate and income. I also discuss the implications of 
the variability of effort supply to the firm, which directly relates to demand side of the labor 
market, affecting the marginal value product. In standard economics the supply of effort is 
assumed fixed, often at some maximum.  
Moreover, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of incorporating the fact 
that individuals have limited information processing capabilities and must also make 
decisions in a world of complex, costly and asymmetric information (often referred to as 
bounded rationality). These same individuals’ decisions are affected by how information is 
framed and by the institutional parameters within which decision are made. Decisions are also 
affected by norms, social context, and past behavior (path dependency). This can result in 
errors in labor market decisions, generating outcomes that are inefficient from both the 
individual’s and society’s perspective and can affect both the supply and demand side of the 
labor market.3   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For broader surveys and ones with a different orientation from what’s presented here see, 
for example, Berg (2006), Charness and Kuhn (2011), Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1987), and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).  
 
3 The notion of errors in decision-making is inconsistent with the worldview of leading 
proponents of the conventional or standard economic wisdom, following upon the arguments 
of Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953), that competitive markets will force efficiency in the 
market, also referred to as the efficient market hypothesis. However, possible errors in 
decision-making are a focal point of contemporary behavioral economics and behavioral 
finance (Altman 1999; Altman 2005b; Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Leibenstein 1966; Shiller 
2001; Thaler and Sustein 2008). When market forces aren’t ‘perfect’, and they usually aren’t, 
product market inefficiencies, sometimes a product of errors in decision-making can be 
pervasive. In the stock market short term bubbles with long term consequences are of 
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This speaks to the notion that the labor market as a social institution, promoted by 
Robert Solow (1990). This understanding has deep roots in behavioral and institutional 
economics (Akerlof 1982, 1984, 2002; Bowles and Gintis 1990; Commons 1934, 1950; Cyert 
and March 1963; Duesenberry 1949; Dunlop 1944; Frank 1985, 1999; Kaufman 1989, 1999a, 
2003a, 2003b, 2008; March and Simon 1968; Tomer 1987; Slichter 1920; Simon 1987; 
Veblen 1899, 1904) and overlaps with aspects of feminist economics (Folbre 2001, 2009; 
Nelson 2009).4 Thus, workers, employers, and the unemployed, can’t be modeled like apples, 
wheat, or computers. Unlike inanimate commodities humans can and do react to changes in 
economic and social variables by varying the quantity and quality of their effort levels and 
hours of market labor supply. And humans respond to economic incentives differently, 
depending on circumstances, which, in turn, impacts on labor market behaviors. This does not 
replace standard demand and supply analysis of the labor market. It rather enriches it, with an 
enhanced economic toolbox. One can still fruitfully exploit basic supply and demand analysis. 
But now the slopes and positions of the demand and supply curves are impacted by 
psychological, sociological, and institutional variables, as they are in real-world labor 
markets. 
2 What is Behavioral Economics 
Following in the tradition of Hebert Simon, behavioral economics and, therefore, 
behavioral labor, aspires to build models based upon more realistic simplifying behavioral 
assumptions by importing and integrating into the economics toolbox insights from 
psychology, sociology, and institutional analyses. These can be expected to simulate more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
importance. And, market forces can do little mitigate errors in consumer or in labor market 
choices. One focus of behavioral economics is to explain errors in decision making as well as 
economic inefficiencies that may or may not be a product of such errors (Simon 1987). 	  4	  Simon (1978, 499) writes: “The principal forerunner of a behavioral theory of the firm is the 
tradition usually called Institutionalism. It is not clear that all of the writings, European and 
American, usually lumped under this rubric have much in common, or that their authors 
would agree with each other’s views. At best, they share a conviction that economic theory 
must be reformulated to take account of the social and legal structures amidst which market 
transactions are carried out. . . . The name of John R. Commons is prominent—perhaps the 
most prominent—among American Institutionalists.” 
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robust descriptions of labor market behavior and generate more accurate analytical 
predictions and credible cause and effect analyses. More realistic modeling assumptions 
minimize the probability spurious correlations, convoluting correlation with causation, linking 
specific behavioral and institutional facts on the ground with predictions.  
Assumptions are embedded in the realistic worldview of the brain as a scarce 
resource, with limited processing capabilities (bounded rationality), as well as the reality of 
imperfect and asymmetric information, heterogeneous decision makers, transaction costs, the 
importance of social norms for decision-making, effort as a variable in the production 
function, and institutional parameters which differentially affect the decision-making process, 
inclusive of bargaining-power, and the choices individuals make. This adds to the traditional 
economics toolbox, which is more focused on the importance of prices and income to 
decision-making. As a consequence, behavioral economists anticipate that individuals will 
often behave in the manner inconsistent with the predictions of standard theory (Akerlof 
1982, 1984, 2002; Altman 2005, 2006b, 2008a; Berg 2006; Gigerenzer 2007; on complex 
information, see Hayak 1945; Kahneman 2011; March 1978; Simon 1955, 1978, 1979, 1987; 
Smith 2003; Todd and Gigerenzer 2003).  
Behavioral labor is influenced by two different, but sometimes overlapping, 
approaches to behavioral economics. In one approach, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2003, 2011; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981; Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman 1981, 1986), it is assumed that individuals 
tend to be error-prone and biased in decision-making because of how the brain is hardwired.  
This generates persistent errors and biases in decision-making that can be sub-optimal from 
both the individual’s and society’s welfare maximizing perspective. Sub-optimality is defined 
as deviating from traditional economic benchmarks of optimal behavior. Such sub-optimal 
decisions need be corrected by the intervention of experts, often through the auspices of 
government (Thaler and Sustein 2008; Babcock, Congdon, Katz, and Mullainathan 2010). 
Pioneered by Herbert Simon (1955, 1978, 1979, 1987), the alternative, bounded 
rationality approach, it is not assumed that individuals are hardwired to behave in a sub-
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optimal errors-prone and biased manner. There can be decision-making errors, but such sub-
optimal behavior can often be corrected by improvements in the decision-making 
environment and through education. Also, bargaining power considerations can affect 
decision-making outcomes—this has nothing to do about errors or biases in decision-making. 
Moreover, individuals can deviate from standard economic decision-making norms, but this 
often results in superior economic outcomes (Altman 2005, 2008a; Gigerenzer 2007; on the 
importance of power, see Rothschild 2002; Smith 2003). 
3 Modeling Labor Supply: A Standard Rendering 
A good entry point for introducing behavioral ideas into labor market theory is the 
standard labor-leisure model of individual labor supply. It hinges upon two behavioral 
assumptions that underlie and drive much of contemporary labor economics: (1) leisure (more 
generally, non-market activities inclusive of sleep) is preferred to work and is modeled as a 
normal good so that changes in real income are positively and causally related to market labor 
supply; (2) making leisure more expensive, by increasing the real wage, holding real income 
constant, will increase the supply of labor and lowering the real wage will reduce the supply 
of labor (Becker 1965). It is implicitly assumed that individuals gain no positive utility from 
labor market activities. However, in reality, utility is accrued not only from the economic 
benefits of work, but also from the non-economic or ‘spiritual’ benefits (Frey and Stutzer 
2002; Helliwell and Huang 2011; Jahoda 1981; Sherman and Shavit 2009). In addition, it is 
assumed that individuals can afford not to work on the market—that people who do not 
participate on the labor market can live on leisure alone. But if the wage rate is too low, many 
individuals will simply not supply labor to the market and will not accept job offers at such 
low wage rates. Given these standard assumptions, the substitution effect predicts that as the 
price (wage rate) of leisure increases, one will supply more labor to the market and therefore 
consume less leisure. But as the wage increases, income goes up, resulting in increasing the 
demand for leisure (income effect). The supply of labor is a product of the interaction of the 
substitution and income effects. Labor supply increases as wages increase—the labor supply 
curve is upward sloping—as long as the substitution effect dominates the income effect. But 
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when the income effect dominates, this yields the ‘classic’ backward bending labor supply 
curve.  
These points are illustrated in Diagram 1, by labor supply curve 1. At W*, market 
labor supply is zero—wages are simply too low to compensate prospective workers for 
sacrificing the good feelings generated from the consumption of leisure time. As wages 
increase, market labor supply goes up until wages rise to W2. Thereafter, the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect and market labor supply falls. All along the individual’s 
labor supply curve the individual is assumed to be maximizing his or her utility or wellbeing, 
even if the individual is unemployed at a particular wage rate or is working seven days week, 
12 hours per day. 
What underlies (the micro-foundations) this type of labor supply curve is illustrated 
in Diagram 2. The fact that the income-non-labor market indifference curve is nonlinear and 
convex to the origin, presumes that income and non-labor time (‘leisure’) are substitutes. In 
this diagram, the individual increases labor supply from N0N1 to N0N2, given indifference 
curves U0 and U1, as the wage rate or the price of nonmarket time increases from 1 to 2. 
Labor supply keeps on increasing as wages rise as long as the substitution effect outweighs 
the income effect. But when the wage rate diminishes, from 2 to 1, individuals substitute out 
of the market labor to nonmarket time and market labor supply falls as long as this 
substitution effect outweighs the income effect of falling real income.  
Related to assumption (2), individuals will accept a wage offer only if their 
reservation wage—the minimal acceptable wage—is high enough. Policy, such as 
improvements to minimum wages, unemployment insurance and social welfare, that increase 
the reservation wage will reduce the percentage of wage offers accepted, increasing 
unemployment, whereas policy that reduces that reservation wage has the opposite effect. 
Changes in the reservation can also affect the supply of labor, by affecting the expected cost 
of leisure time. Increases to the reservation rate will reduce the supply of labor to the extent 
that individuals expect a higher wage rate to compensate them for sacrificing a unit of leisure 
(shifting the labor supply curve to the left). Moreover, increases in the reservation wage are 
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predicted by the standard model to increase the overall wage rates paid by firms across the 
spectrum from low to high wage firms, increasing average production costs and, thereby, 
increasing unemployment.5 
A critical problem with the standard model of labor supply is that it fails to provide 
any reasonable predictions on the timing and direction of changes in labor time. Rather, once 
one knows the shape of the labor supply curve, what tends to be argued is that a particular 
change in the relationship between the substitution and income effect ‘caused’ a change in 
labor supply. By assumption, other possible causal variables, even those that are more 
plausible from a reality-based perspective are not ever brought into consideration (this is a 
serious omitted variable problem).  
There is no empirical or theoretical basis to predict when, or the extent to which, 
there should be a change in the relationship between income and substitution effects such that 
labor supply increases and then diminishes.  Moreover, one can’t predict, ex ante, under what 
circumstances there would be a reversal in the dominance of the substitution and income 
effects causing labor supply to increase again, generating an s-shaped labor supply curve 
(Diagram 1, supply curve 2) (For problems and issues with contemporary labor supply theory 
see, for example, Altman 2001; Pencavel 1986; Prasch 2000; see Dessing 2002 and Sharif 
2000, on s-shaped supply curves in less developed economies).   
In the real world, we have witnessed such s-shaped labor curves, wherein hours 
worked per week initially fell in currently developed economies, in the late nineteenth 
century, when workers often worked six to seven days a week, often for more than ten hours a 
day, with little or no vacation time. More recently, in many of these economies, hours worked 
per week increased from lows of less than 40 hours per week (Messenger, Lee, McCann 
2007). What is required is a model of market labor supply that ex ante predicts labor market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Friedman (1968) and Mulligan (2013), respectively, provide the old and new versions of this 
perspective. They argue that the long run equilibrium rate of unemployment (which is often 
referred to as the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment is best reduced by cutting if not eliminating 
safety or social security programs that have the effect of increasing the reservation wage.	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behavior, generating analytical predictions using credible behavioral and institutional 
assumptions.  
4 A Behavioral Model of Labor Supply: A Target Approach 
In the target approach, real target income and target non-market activities are 
introduced into the modeling of market labor supply (see Altman 2001 and Camerer, Babcock, 
Lowenstein, Thaler 1997; Baxter 1993; and Kaufman 1989, 1999, for more details).6 It is 
argued that individuals’ labor supply decisions can be more robustly modeled by making the 
simplifying assumption that individuals are most concerned with their target income and their 
target non-market activities. This is opposed to the standard focus on the relative price of 
leisure and the capacity of individuals to purchase more leisure time. The notion that target 
income can be important to market labor supply decisions is not new, but has not had much 
impact on the standard labor supply literature. 
One can write the target theory as market labor supply being a function of target 
market income, target nonmarket activities, nonmarket income, and the real wage rate 
(Altman 2001). This argument can take the form of: 𝐿!" = 𝐹(𝑇𝑌,𝑇𝑁𝑀𝐿,𝑁𝑀𝑌,𝑤) 
TY is real target income, TNML is target nonmarket time, NMY is real nonmarket 
income, and w is the real wage rate. Market labor supply can be measured by hours supplied 
to the labor market. Given real target income, labor supply is given by the real wage rate, 
conditional upon target nonmarket time and real nonmarket income, or: 
𝐿!" = 𝑇𝑌 − 𝑁𝑀𝑌𝑊 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛  𝑇𝑁𝑀𝐿 
Given TY, NMY, and W market labor supply is determined. It is important to note 
the importance of TNML, such as childcare and care of disabled loved-ones, for example, in 
determining TY. 7 The higher the TNML, the lower the market labor supply. Such would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There are some points of intersection between the target theory and the arguments presented 
in Prasch (2000).  
7 More generally, Kaufman (1989), building upon the work of social psychologist Abraham 
Maslow, (1954) makes the case that labor market choices are determined, among other 
variables, by the hierarchy of needs of the individual, where realizing these needs can 
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the case with single-parent female led households with no affordable childcare. On the other 
hand, artists or musicians who are happy (maximizing utility) at a low target income so that 
more time is devoted off-market to painting and music, will supply minimal labor to the labor 
market. Overall, ceteris paribus, one can model increasing target minimum nonmarket time as 
shifting the market labor supply curve to the left whilst reducing this target shifts the market 
labor supply curve to the right.  
Real target income is defined inclusive of expenses required to earn a particular level 
of target real income, such as taxes, daycare, appropriate clothing, and transportation costs. 
Once target income is known, one can more accurately predict the price effect (the slope of 
the labor supply curve) of a change in wages. Moreover, ceteris paribus, changes in target 
income affects the extent to which changes in wages affect labor supply, since the ability to 
realize a given level of real target income is a product of real wages and hours worked.  
For example, if real target income is met at a given real wage and number of hours 
worked, increasing real wages will reduce the supply of labor.8 If real target income increases, 
on the other hand, the supply labor would increase at any given real wage to meet the 
increased target income. Moreover, if real target income exceeds what can be realized at the 
current real wage and a given (maximum) labor supply, increasing real wage can be expected 
to have no effect on labor supply until the real wage is high enough, in combination with 
hours worked, to achieve the target income. And, at this point, if real target income increases, 
labor supply would not fall in the face of increasing real wages if these higher wages, in 
combination with the existing level of market labor supply, are required to either approach or 
realize the higher level of target income. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overwhelm any predicted substitution and income effects of the standard model. This	  often 
generates preference functions characterized by a lexicographical or L-shaped indifference 
curves. Individuals are motivated to realize their needs contained by the hierarchy of needs 
one step at a time, beginning with the lower order needs.	  	  8	  Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein, and Thaler’s (1997) target model of labor supply focuses 
on taxi drivers, where the evidence suggests that, on average, target income is fixed, thus 
increasing wages reduces the supply of labor. This model builds on very short run objective 
functions. See Farber (2005) for a critique of the Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein, and Thaler 
(1997) rendition of the target income approach.	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It is important to note that there is evidence supportive of the hypothesis that target 
income increases over time resulting in a persistent and sometimes growing gap between 
actual real income of the individual or household and the real target income of the individual 
or household (Altman 2001; Berry 1994; Lebergott (1993, p. 65). This might very well be a 
product of sellers promoting new products by creating new wants (Frank, 1985, 1999, 2005; 
Galbraith 1965; George 2001), the desire of individuals to maintain their relative income 
position in relation to their peers (Duesenberry 1949; Easterlin 2001; and Leibenstein 1950) 
and, possibly related to this, the increasing material aspiration levels of individuals (Easterlin 
2001; Lebergott 1993; Mach 1956; March and Simon 1968; Sanders 2008; Shane and 
Loewenstein 1999; Stutzer 2004). If real target income did not increase over time in 
developed economies, most people there would not have to work very much at all today to 
purchase what their forefathers and foremothers purchased in the early twentieth century. No 
more than 10-15 hours work per week would be required to achieve the average income of 
early twentieth century Americans and no more than 10-15 minutes per week to reach the 
income levels of the Kapauku Papuans of the Pacific Islands (Altman 2001; Lebergott 1993, p. 
65). 
Hours worked have declined over the past-100 odd years in economies that are 
currently developed but not nearly as much as they should have if target real income had not 
increased. Moreover, hours of work tend to decline quite dramatically amongst developing 
low-income economies but only in a fashion consistent with increasing real income. And, 
amongst the developed wealthy economies there is little relationship between hours worked 
per week and increases in real wages (Messenger, Lee, McCann 2007). In all instances, the 
evidence tends to support the hypothesis that real target income increases over time.  
Whatever the cause, the fact that real target income has and does increase is critically 
important to understanding the evolution of market labor supply and to predicting future 
movements in market labor supply. Here we have an evidenced-based variable (unlike the 
substitution and income effects) that drives market labor supply over historical time. This 
allows for more substantive economic predictions and causal analyses. 
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A key point of the target approach is that the market supply of labor is driven by the 
basic needs and the unsatisfied wants of individuals.9 In this instance, substitution effects are 
often of little analytical consequence. Indeed, when market labor supply is fixed for target 
income reasons the individual’s indifference curve for income and nonmarket or leisure time 
will be L-shaped as with indifference curve U3 in Diagram 2—we have lexicographic 
indifference curves. As the wage rate changes from 1 to 3 or from 3 to 1, there is no change in 
the preferred amount of nonmarket activities and, therefore, in market labor supply. 
Individuals are not willing sacrifice real income to obtain more nonmarket activities. Labor 
supply changes here, not as a consequence of changes in the price of nonmarket or ‘leisure’ 
time (substitution effect), but as a function of changes in target income and whether an 
increase in the wage rate yields a real income that exceeds the current target income. If the 
latter occurs, there is a decrease in labor supply as a result of the target income being 
surpassed at the higher real wage and the given amount of hours worked. Once one knows an 
individual’s target income, one can predict market labor supply as the real wage rate changes.  
The trade-off between market income and nonmarket activities is illustrated in 
Diagram 3. In the target income model, since the indifference curves are assumed to be L-
shaped, the individual’s market labor supply decision is based on target income, as opposed 
income-‘leisure’ trade-offs in terms of substitution effects. As the wage rate increases, from 1 
to 2, the individual can choose to maintain his or her prior supply of market labor (N0N1) and 
maximize income, at 0C, forthcoming from the increased wage. On the other hand, the 
individual can reduce market labor supply to N0N2, and increase income to 0B. In this case, 
BC of income is sacrificed in order to increase nonmarket activities from 0N1 to 0N3. These 
choices, based on an individual’s target income, can all be utility maximizing and is given by 
the tangency of indifference curves U1, U2, and U0, to their respective price lines.  
In one plausible scenario, one begins a market labor supply narrative at very low real 
wages and a very high level of market labor supply, such as 60 hours (a ten hour workday of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This generalized target income modeling of labor supply is based on Altman (2001).	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six days) per week, not uncommon in the nineteenth century industrial world. Increasing 
nonmarket time as real wages increase eventually proves to be a higher order need than a 
further increase in real income (Altman, 1999e; Cross, 1988). In Diagram 3, utility is 
maximized at a low level of nonmarket activities, such as 0N1, in an attempt to meet target 
income. Initial increases in real wages can be expected to have no effect on target nonmarket 
activities if target income has yet to be met at the still relatively very low real wage rates. But 
as real wages increase further, the next step in the hierarchy of needs and wants would be to 
increase nonmarket time from its very low levels, and utility would be maximized at N3 of 
nonmarket time. In this case, both nonmarket time and real income increases (to 0D from 0C). 
Once the need for more nonmarket time is met, it becomes possible to meet higher order 
needs as real wages increase, which can be either more nonmarket time or more market goods. 
If target real income increases whilst target nonmarket time is being met, further increases in 
real wages can be expected to have no effect on the supply of labor. In this scenario, utility 
can only be increased by increasing real income as wages rise. Increasing nonmarket time 
cannot compensate an individual for any reduction in income—the indifference curve is L-
shaped. In this modeling of labor supply the substitution effect is zero while the income effect 
depends on the time-specific ranking of market income and nonmarket time.  
The resulting labor supply curve, FGHJ, mapped out from this indifference curve 
analysis, is illustrated in Diagram 3a. This is a type of long run market labor supply curve, 
where two independent variables are changing, both the wage rate and preferences for goods 
and services. At low levels of real income, the labor supply curve is perfectly inelastic, at 0L1, 
to changes in the real wage rate. There is a backward bend to the labor supply curve at point 
G, at wage rate W2. Thereafter, as the wage rate increases from W3, the labor supply curve is 
once again inelastic to increases in the real wage rate. This type of labor supply curve is 
consistent with the evidence across time and place (Messenger, Lee, and McCann 2007, p. 
33). Based on the target theory of labor supply, one would predict a drop in market labor 
supply only if the target wants of individuals cease increasing in pace with increasing real 
wages.  
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It is also important to emphasize that this modeling of labor supply has not taken into 
consideration the utility that individuals obtain from market work (Frey and Stutzer 2002; 
Helliwell and Huang 2011; Jahoda 1981; Sherman and Shavit 2009). This utility can be quite 
rational—as the act of working and working with others, being part of a group, can make 
people feel better. This psychological variable, itself, can set a floor to market labor supply. 
Even if real target income is met, labor supply may not diminish if the given level of labor 
supply is utility maximizing in terms of the psychological kick the individual obtains from 
working. Any increase in the utility an individual obtains from market work can be modeled 
as an outward shift in the labor supply curve, such as from labor supply curve 1 to 2 in 
Diagram 1. However, if the work environment is nasty, this does not imply that an individual 
will reduce her or his supply of labor. This is especially the case when a given amount of 
market labor is required to meet the real target income of the individual. Still, one could 
predict that a poor work environment can, on the margin, in higher income societies, have the 
effect of shifting the labor supply curve inward to the left. 
Another important psychological shift factor for the labor supply curve is referred to 
as the discouraged worker effect. An individual becomes discouraged if she loses confidence 
in his ability to find work and stops actively searching for work. This person, in effect drops 
out of the labor market, even while still desiring market employment. This shifts the market 
labor supply curve to the left. Whilst increasing aggregate demand, invigorated animal spirits, 
improved job search mechanisms, reduce the discouraged workers’ effect, shifts the 
economy-wide market labor supply curve outward to the right (on the importance of animal 
spirits see, Akerlof and Shiller 2009).  
An important footnote to this target theory of labor supply is that individuals’ ability 
to choose their preferred amount of labor supply, given the wage rate and their target income, 
is affected by the political-legal environment in which labor market decisions are made. 
Standard labor market theory assumes an institutional environment wherein individuals 
choose how much to work based on the wage rate—the opportunity cost of nonmarket time or 
‘leisure’. But at one extreme, where free labor markets do not exist, such as with slavery or 
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serfdom, individuals are not free to choose and choice is severely constrained by the employer, 
slave owner, or landlord. Where free labor markets predominate, individuals own their labor 
power—they are legally endowed with private property rights over their labor power—and 
individuals’ market labor supply decisions are effected by institutional parameters such as 
labor unions and nonmarket income such as unemployment insurance and social security 
(social welfare payments).  The target labor supply theory can incorporate various types of 
institutional parameters. For example, where labor has limited legal rights, labor supply can 
be constrained to the physiological maximum and the labor supply curve would be perfectly 
inelastic at this maximum supply of market labor, such as labor supply curve 3 in Diagram 1. 
Where more labor rights obtain, workers can choose to supply less labor as real wages 
increase, if this choice set maximizes their utility. Here, the slope of the market labor supply 
curve changes. It goes from being completely inelastic to somewhat elastic. 
Labor market discrimination can also affect labor supply, shifting the economy-wide 
market labor supply curve to the left. If particular groups in society are precluded from labor 
market participation, members of these groups can’t participate even if they are willing to 
work at prevailing wage rates. Their revealed preference for market work is stymied by 
institutional variables. Their absence from the labor market has nothing to do with the 
substitution and income effects. It has much to do with legal, cultural, and social constraints 
on choice behavior. Reducing labor market discrimination should shift the market labor 
supply curve to the right, as more individuals, women for example, choose to seek 
employment to meet their target income and to meet their psychological need to participate in 
the world of work. The extent of this shift can be in part determined by estimating the 
shortfall between actual real income and target income.  
5.1 Non-Labor Market Income and Labor Supply 
Increasing nonmarket sources of income would not reduce labor force participation 
unless target income is met with the assistance of the nonmarket sources of income and 
market work has no positive effect on utility. This point speaks to the introduction of or 
increases in ‘social welfare’ payments or unemployment insurance and their potential impact 
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on labor supply. The standard model predicts that such nonmarket increases in income will 
reduce labor supply whereas a decrease in such income will increase labor supply through the 
income effect, assuming that nonmarket time is a normal good. These so-called demogrants 
shift the labor supply curve (Friedman 1968; Mulligan 2013). Such predictions pay no 
attention to the individuals’ target income, their target level of nonmarket time, their physical 
capacity to work, their hierarchy of wants, and the rules and regulations that dictate the terms 
under which individuals are entitled to demogrants of one type or another (Altman 2004a, 
2004b). Also, no attention is paid to the utility gained from the act of engaging in market 
work (Sherman and Shavit 2009). Such utility diminishes the impact that demogrants might 
otherwise have on labor supply. The utility gained from working on the market and with 
others might overwhelm the utility gaining from non-market activities. The traditional 
model’s prediction needs to be modified to incorporate these non-economic variables.  
Overall, increasing social welfare would reduce labor supply only to the extent that 
such income meets the individual’s target real income and the individual gains no utility from 
working on the labor market. Where such utility exists, the social welfare payments would 
have to exceed market income to compensate for the loss of work-related utility (Sherman 
and Shavit 2009). The target approach to labor supply would predict that as long as target 
income is not met, ceteris paribus, labor supply should not be reduced by the introduction or 
increases in the level of social welfare. In this case, social welfare would form a basis of 
economic support for individuals who prefer to work but are unable to obtain employment. 
The predicted impact of increases of social welfare on labor supply is much more complex 
than in the standard model, requiring information on target income and the utility of market 
work. 
For work capable individuals, the target approach suggests that such individuals 
would be on social welfare because they have a low target income (covered by social 
welfare), do not gain utility from working, have a higher order preference for nonmarket 
activities, cannot find work (or are discouraged work searchers) or are not capable of work 
(disabled population). Behavioral economics would be open to the hypothesis that lack of job 
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opportunities can result in individuals being on social welfare even though they prefer to 
work—the demand side of the labor market affects the supply side. Also, market work might 
also be discouraged, when jobs are available, if the tax rate on market work results in net 
income being greater if one does not accept available and otherwise acceptable job offers. 
This is an important institutional parameter requiring consideration. To increase labor supply 
here requires a change and/or restructuring of the tax rate and more job opportunities; not the 
elimination of social welfare (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2003; Starky 2006). 
Individuals who are not in the labor market for psychological reasons might also not 
increase their labor force participation even if, as a consequence, they must suffer economic 
losses (their target income drops). The psychological cost of entering the labor market might 
outweigh possible benefits, especially if they have very negative views of labor market 
conditions. Reducing social welfare would, in this case, simply increase the level of economic 
deprivation amongst these individuals. Other means would be required to increase labor 
supply inclusive of overcoming individuals’ biases and misinformation on the state of the 
labor market. 
Overall, eliminating or reducing social welfare should increase labor supply, but 
realistically, not by much, given the small percentage of the population in most countries on 
social welfare. This increase in labor supply would have little to do with the income or 
substitution effects as specified in the standard model. What is critical to understanding labor 
market dynamics with regards to social welfare, from a behavioral perspective, is to better 
understand the non-economic, inclusive of psychological, sociological, and institutional, 
factors underlying why individuals are outside of the labor market.  
For example, the disabled who are not work capable can’t work, so reducing social 
welfare simply increases these individuals level of economic deprivation. Stay-at-home moms 
might be on welfare (low target income) so as to take care of their children, absent childcare 
facilities, for example. Reducing social welfare might force some of these individuals onto the 
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labor market, shifting the labor supply curve outward and reducing the wage rate thereby 
reducing the level of economic sustenance provide by the market (Solow 2003).  But this has 
nothing to do with traditional income effects. It has more to do with mothers being forced 
unto the labor market to meet minimal target incomes at the opportunity cost of taking care of 
their children. This can also have the long-term effect of reducing the supply of labor 
controlling for quality, by reducing the labor market capabilities of children. However, single 
mothers, can reduce target income as social welfare is cut, so as to be able to take care of their 
children, increasing the economic deprivation within their household. In this case, any 
increase in labor supply predicted by the standard model would not take place or would be 
mitigated. This being said, unless a vibrant labor market accompanies cuts to social welfare, 
the increased labor supply generated by such cuts, simply increases the number of 
unemployed and reduces the equilibrium wage. A key determinant of poverty and social 
welfare dependency is the absence or lack of work, hence the significance of vibrant labor 
markets, ceteris paribus (International Labour Organization (2010). World Social Security 
Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva: International 
Labour Organization; Rice et. al., 2012; Solow 2003).  
5.2 Unemployment Insurance and Labor Supply 
The above discussion is also pertinent to an understanding of unemployment 
insurance, which the standard model predicts should result in increasing unemployment by 
affecting labor market behavior. The standard model argues that unemployment insurance 
serves to increase the rate of unemployment by various means. Unemployment rates are 
predicted to increase by attracting into the labor market individuals who intend to quit their 
new jobs so as to collect this benefit, by increasing the voluntary job search time of those 
unemployed workers who are already in the labor force, by inducing increasing quit rates of 
the currently employed so that they can search for better jobs, and by increasing the market 
wage thereby increasing the price of labor and reducing the overall competitiveness of the 
economy. Moreover, following upon the efficiency wage literature, unemployment insurance 
is expected to reduce the effort incentive effect of a given rate of unemployment 
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(unemployment is viewed as a disciplinary devise to keep effort levels at higher levels, both 
forcing up real wages to compensate and, thereby, increasing the unemployment rate ) (see 
below for a detailed discussion of efficiency wages) (Altman 2004a; Holmlund 1998; Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984).  
The standard approach also assumes that the increased duration of short-term job 
search by the unemployment induced by unemployment insurance can have no positive effect 
on long term employment rates. It is further assumed that higher real wages necessarily or 
typically generate higher production costs and thereby higher rates of unemployment. Neither 
of these assumptions need hold. It is further assumed that the marginal worker maximizes 
utility or economic wellbeing at low levels of real income thus allowing unemployment 
insurance to serve as a utility maximizing ‘wage of being unemployed’. Thus, some workers 
maximize their utility by getting themselves laid off so as to take advantage of unemployment 
insurance, which is always less than the income one earns at work. 
The available empirical evidence provides no unambiguous support for the 
conventional proposition that unemployment insurance damages the economy (Altman 2004a; 
Holmlund 1998; Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Howell and Azizoglu 2011; Howell and 
Rehm 2009). For example, to the extent that unemployment increases search time and this 
produces a better match between job searcher and job, this can reduce job turnover and 
thereby reduce the long-term unemployment rate (Altman 2004a).  Also, since unemployment 
insurance is typically much less than market income, individuals won’t quite their jobs to earn 
unemployment insurance unless their target income is relatively quite low and they attach 
little or no utility to market work. Also, most workers are not eligible for unemployment 
insurance if they simply quite their jobs. This institutional reality, critical to a behavioralist 
analysis, often precludes unemployment insurance from actually directly causing an increase 
in the unemployment rate (Holmlund 1998; Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). Finally, one 
can’t easily predict the extent to which unemployment insurance increases the market wage 
and the extent to which this increases costs and thereby unemployment. Efficiency wage 
theory and especially x-efficiency theory predicts different plausible outcomes wherein 
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increasing wages have a positive effect on productivity that can offset any wage increases 
(see below). 
It is critically important from both an analytical and public policy perspective to 
develop a theoretical framework that incorporates the empirics suggesting that unemployment 
insurance generates no long run negative economic effects, inclusive of reducing labor 
supply—shifting the labor supply curve inwards. Introducing more realistic behavioral and 
institutional assumptions into ones modeling of unemployment insurance contributes to this 
task of developing and testing a variety of hypotheses relating unemployment insurance to 
labor supply and employment. 
6 Non-Economic Variables and Errors or Biases in Labor Market Decision-Making 
Labor supply can be affected by psychological variables such as inaccurate 
perceptions about labor marker opportunities. Some behavioral economists define and 
interpret these as cognitive illusions (Babcock, Congdon, Katz and Mullainathan 2010). This 
overlaps with the severely critiqued ‘culture of poverty’ literature wherein it is maintained 
that poverty persists because of the cultural (and related innate biases) of the poor (Gorski 
2008; Wilson 1997). But these misperceptions can also be viewed as a product of poor or 
incorrect information sets, cognitive costs, loss or risk adverse behavior in a world of 
uncertainty, peer effects, social capital, or psychological depression, all consistent with the 
Herbert Simon’s perspective on behavioral economics (see also March 1978). In this case, 
one has rational individuals whose choices might be improved (even from their own 
perspective or objective function) with improvements in the decision-making environment. 
Either way, introducing non-economic variables into the analytical mix allows one to better 
explain certain aspects behavior and to suggest policy to improve labor market outcomes. 
Of critical importance, is the now established fact that persistent involuntary 
unemployment causes depression and other mental health issues, including loss of self-esteem 
and loss of a sense of control amongst the unemployed. This has negative, possibly long term, 
repercussions on the families of the unemployed, which can have long-term negative labor 
market consequences for all family members. Basically, long-term unemployment results in 
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the depreciation in the human capital stock of the unemployed. This is probably one reason 
why the long-term unemployed tend to end up with jobs paying less than their former jobs. 
Long-term unemployment also reduces, on average, the long run capital stock of family 
members. Moreover, such unemployment sends negative signals to prospective employers 
resulting in the long-term unemployed being less likely to secure future employment than 
individuals who are short term unemployed. It appears that in a world of asymmetric 
information, employers use long-term unemployment as a signal for relatively poorer future 
performance and employability—a form of statistical discrimination. These variables cause a 
downward shift in the demand curve for labor. 
Long-term unemployment also increases the probability of morbidity, reduces life 
expectancy, and increases the probability of family violence. The mental health effects of 
unemployment feed into the human capital side of the story, contributing to reducing human 
capital stock, which reduces the probability of get a job, which increases mental health 
problems, which reduces human capital stock. In addition, because of depression (related to 
this, loss of self-confidence), due to unemployment, there is a lower probability of job search 
amongst the long-term unemployed—this relates to the discouraged worker effect. Overall, 
long-term unemployment by reducing human capital stock per prospective employee reduces 
the employability of such individuals at any given real wage rate. For this reason, persistent 
long-term unemployment can have the effect of increasing the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. And, by increasing the discouraged worker effect, fewer workers are 
searching for jobs and this reduces the amount of employment, assuming that a percentage of 
such job searches would secure employment (Adams 2012; Babcock, Congdon, Katz and 
Mullainathan 2010; Darity and Goldsmith 1996; Jahoda 1981; Linn, Sandifer, and Stein 1985; 
Paul and Moser 2009; Stuckler and Basu 2013;	  Zukin 2009). 
Applied economics is increasingly integrating these findings into its corpus. And 
many economists recommend that it is critically important to reduce long-term 
unemployment, not only for the mental anguish it causes the unemployed and their families, 
but also because of the serious deleterious effects it has on productivity.  So, a big public 
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policy question relates to how can one most effectively and efficiently reduce the long run 
unemployment rate given the importance of these particular non-economic variables. 
With regards macroeconomic policy, behavioral economics places close attention to 
the importance of psychological variables, such as confidence and animal spirits, in moving 
the economy forward. It’s not only about monetary and fiscal policy (Akerlof and Shiller 
2009). Rather it is about such policy contextualized within decision-making parameters 
wherein psychological variables play a vital determining role on the extent and timing of 
spending (see below for a detailed discussion).  
Behavioral economics also pays close attention to informational concerns, capital 
market imperfections, and uncertainty, affecting labor market behavior. Unemployed workers 
can and do underestimate the probability of securing employment at preferred real wages 
rates and annual income. This can be a product individuals suffering from a loss of 
confidence who then might become discouraged workers. In this case, individuals 
significantly underestimate the probability of securing a job that falls within their job offer 
acceptance set. This market failure, related to errors in decision-making, can be corrected by 
more direct intervention by job search agencies and client specific advisors who can provide 
individuals with more direct information on job prospects and facilitate the interview process. 
In this instance the default is that the job search agency leads the job search process as 
opposed to the traditional default where the unemployed are left to take the initiative. The 
traditional default does not work effectively when workers are literally psyched out of the job 
search process and subject to imperfect and even misleading information. Workers may also 
not have the financial means to engage in effective job search—inadequate funds for 
transportation, presentable clothing, and childcare. This can be addressed by more direct 
intervention in the job search process, facilitating such individuals moving into the job 
market, to correct for market failure. In this case, the intervention increases the job search 
capabilities of the unemployment as opposed to building policy based on the conventional 
assumption that adequate capabilities are in place and the unemployed would rather engage in 
‘leisure’ activities than find a job.  
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This approach does not assume that individuals are engaged in biased decision-
making—an assumption made by many behavioral economists. Rather, ‘real’ variables 
generate correctable decision-making errors. Given these ‘real’ variables, changing the 
defaults affect decision-making in terms of how the new defaults provide better information, 
reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and help compensate for under-confidence amongst 
the unemployed. 
 Moreover, behavioral economics, in the tradition of institutional economics pays 
close attention to components of long-run unemployment that are structural. Many 
unemployed will not find employment in jobs that require their former skill set because of the 
changing nature of the economy. To move forward in the job market, adequate job retraining 
is required as is accurate information on job opportunities and the necessary skills sets 
necessary for available jobs. In a world of asymmetric information and imperfect capital 
markets individuals may not have the capacity to invest in skill upgrading. In this case, either 
subsidized or public job retraining programs would be required to fix such a market failure.  
But there is another approach to the causes of long-run unemployment embedded to 
the Kahneman-Tversky errors and biases approach to behavioral economics (for a survey of 
this see, Babcock, Congdon, Katz, and Mullainathan 2010). In this approach, individuals are 
assumed to suffer from a range of biases, such as present or status quo bias, loss aversion 
(losses are weighted more heavily than gains), hyperbolic discounting (procrastination). This 
results in such individuals not knowing what’s in their own best interest. As a result, the 
unemployed engage in inadequate job search and reject job offers that should be accepted 
given the objective labor market conditions. In this case, workers actually suffer from errors 
in decision-making based on an overconfidence bias. Part of the problem specifically relates 
to the unemployed setting their reservation wage too high, based on the wages in their former 
jobs, which no longer reflects the objective reality of the labor market. The difference 
between their former wage and current and lower wage offers (the former wage is regarded as 
an anchor) are also treated as a loss of income by the unemployed. And, given loss aversion, 
this type of framing of job offers incentivizes the unemployed to reject what are objectively 
	   23	  
optimal job offers. In summary, these various biases result in too many of the unemployed 
procrastinating in job search, not spending enough time searching for a job, and rejecting 
what are the best possible jobs offers. All this causes the rate of unemployment to be greater 
than it should otherwise be—what it would be in a de-biased world.  
Given the existence of unemployment insurance, one solution to this type of biased 
decision-making would be to provide wage-loss insurance to the unemployed that would 
temporarily subsidize a worker’s income when he or she accepts a relatively low-paying job. 
This reduces perceived income loss (as well as loss aversion) and therefore incentivizes 
individuals to increase their job search and increase the acceptance rate of relatively low 
paying job offers. It is also argued that framing wage loss insurance explicitly in the pay 
statement will help push wage expectations downwards towards an objectively given lower 
level. All of this would serve to reduce long-run rate of unemployment by pro-actively 
dealing with the biased decision-making of the unemployed. 
This errors and biases approach to long-run unemployment does not deny the 
importance of inaccurate information and information processing costs as possible causes of 
errors in decision-making. But the focus is on cognitive biases. In a very real sense, the biased 
decisions of unemployed are an importance cause of persistent unemployment. A key prior 
assumption here is that there exists a supply of jobs available to meet the demand for jobs 
given that price of labor is right—in this case the real wage rate must be low enough. In other 
words, the demand side is not a problem. It is also assumed that there is no negative 
efficiency wage effect of dropping the wage rate. It is assumed that a lower wage rate won’t 
cause such a drop in productivity that employing the lower wage, less efficient worker, 
becomes unprofitable.  
In the bounded rationality approach, where individuals are largely rational and smart, 
correcting information errors, more accurately framing information, providing less costly 
access to information, reducing job search costs, improving individual capabilities to engage 
in job search, job re-training, and addressing depression induced lack of confidence, is of 
greater importance to achieve the objective of reducing long-run unemployment, both from 
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the demand and supply side. From the perspective of the bounded rationality approach, 
correctable errors in decision-making and inadequate capabilities amongst the unemployed 
are thought to be the larger problem. This does not deny, however, the possibility of biases in 
decision-making. And, of course, given optimal conditions on the supply side, jobs offer must 
be available to the job searchers. Otherwise, these individuals will remain unemployed 
irrespective of ideal supply side conditions that explicitly deal with decision-making problems 
related to cognitive, informational, and transaction costs issues.  
7 Demand for Labor and the Supply of Effort  
Labor supply does not simply comprise of hours worked, although this is the point of 
focus of standard and even much of heterodox labor economics. Also of importance is the 
quality and quantity of effort supply per unit of employed labor. In other words, a given hour 
of work can be characterized by a wide range of effort inputs that, in turn, can have a very 
large effect on the quantity and quality of output. This effort dimension of effort supply is a 
critical point of focus of the behavioral economics originating in the work of Akerlof and 
Leibenstein (Akerlof 1982, 1984, 2002; see also Akerlof and Yellen 1986, 1988, 1990; 
Akerlof, Dickens, Perry 1996, 2000; Altman 1998, 2005, 2006a; Bowles and Gintis 1990; 
Frantz 1997; Leibenstein 1957, 19666, 1979; and Solow 1979, 1990). Variations in effort 
supply, in turn, are important determinants of the demand for labor, by affecting the marginal 
product of labor and therefore the marginal value product. 
In the standard model, effort per unit of hour worked is assumed fixed, invariant to 
any circumstance in which labor, management, or owners might find themselves. This 
assumes away the potential importance of effort as a critical component of labor supply. 
Introducing effort variability into the production function as well as into the objective 
function of firm members allows one to better model how individuals might respond to a 
variety of incentive environments. Two critical areas of research incorporating effort 
variability fall under the nomenclature of efficiency wage and x-efficiency theory. Much of 
this literature assumes rational individuals who are smart, consistent, and goal oriented. But 
they are not necessarily motivated to maximize their effort inputs.   
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One should note that there is an abundance of evidence demonstrating that effort is a 
variable in the production function, inclusive of the research of Akerlof and Leibenstein (see 
above; for a review of the literature see also Altman 2002; Frantz 1997). It is also clear that 
effort varies with a variety of variables, inclusive of wages, other aspects of working 
conditions, relations with the employer, and the known costs of shirking from ‘maximum’ 
effort inputs. Studies of firms across economies and over time strongly suggest that 
productivity varies across firms, controlling for traditional economic variables. An important 
determinant of such productivity differentials is variations in effort input per unit of labor. 
From these studies, it is clear that effort variability is significantly affected by managerial 
design, working conditions, and the extent of cooperation, trust, and fairness within the firm 
across agents, especially between and amongst agents and principles (Akerlof 2002; Altman 
2002, 2006a; Bewley 1999; Buchele and Christainsen 1999; Gordon 2006, Leibenstein 1983; 
Levine and Tyson 1990; Logue and Yates 1999; McKersie and Klein 1983; Pfeffer 1995; 
Tomer 1987; Winther and Marens 1997).  
Moreover, research in experimental economics, largely using classroom experiments, 
affirms what one finds in the real world. Experiments suggest that wages and effort inputs are 
highly and positively correlated. In some experiments, hypothetical workers reward 
hypothetical employers for paying higher wages by increasing effort and punish such 
employers for reducing wages by cutting effort input. This is referred to as reciprocal 
punishment. Thus, there is a cost involved in not paying employees what is perceived to be a 
fair wage (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson 2003; Fehr and Gachter 2000, 2002; Henrich, 
Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis and McElreath 2001; Ben-Ner and Putterman 2009; 
Putterman 2012; for a critical and more nuanced perspective on effort variability and wages, 
see Rigdon 2002).10 Some of this experimental literature is reviewed in Charness and Kuhn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This experimental research is closely related to the Ultimatum Game, pioneered by Güth, 
Schmittberger, Schwarze (1982), experiments where there is a proposer and responder. In this 
type of game, usually done in a university classroom setting, the proposer is allocated a sum 
of money (usually tokens which have some real monetary value) from which he or she must 
make an offer (a percentage of the proposer’s allocation to the responder). If the responder 
refuses the offer, then both parties end up with nothing. The standard economic prediction is 
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(2011; see also Falk and Fehr 2003; for a more critical perspective on field experiments, see 
Edwards 2012).11  
The real world firm-based research that speaks to effort variability examines and 
sheds light upon the importance of labor relations and economic and noneconomic incentives 
affecting labor productivity and therefore the overall size of the economic pie. Efficiency 
wage and x-efficiency theory models effort variability and often informs and helps structure 
empirical analyses on the subject, including ongoing research in experimental economics. 
 Some of the key features of the assumption of effort variability for labor supply are 
illustrated in Diagram 4. In the standard model, effort is invariant to differences in wage rates. 
It is fixed, such as at 0m, and is perfectly inelastic with respect to changes in the wage rate. It 
is typically assumed that 0m is a maximum in terms of both the quality and quantity of effort 
input. Once effort is assumed to be variable, one has an effort supply function, the form of 
which is an empirical question. In Diagram 4, there are three effort supply functions, 
illustrating diminishing returns, constant returns, and increasing returns subject to eventually 
diminishing returns. At a particular wage rate, the behavioral effort function converges to the 
standard one, where effort supply is maxed-out and is perfectly inelastic to further increases 
in the wage rate. In the behavioral model, for each hour worked, there can be a multiplicity of 
effort levels and therefore productivity levels as a function of the wage rate and, more 
generally, the level of working conditions and the state of industrial relations. Therefore, 
unlike in the standard model, the demand curve for labor cannot be derived independently of 
the wage rate and working conditions. As effort inputs change, by changing the marginal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that the proposer should offer next to nothing and the responder should accept the offer since 
something is better than nothing. For this reason, this is what a ‘rational’ material maximizing 
individual should do. However, the results from multiple such experiments, including some 
field experiments, offer that are below 30-40 percent of the proposer’s allocation is rejected, 
even in one-shot games. Responders are willing to punish proposers, even at a cost to 
themselves, for what are deemed to be unfair offers. And, often proposers make fair offers 
from the get go. Subjects are not acting neoclassically rational. But they are rational, if 
fairness is part of their objective function. Results are affected by social and cultural context, 
however. 11	  For some limitations to classroom experiments see, for example, Levitt and List (2008).	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value product of labor, this shifts the demand curve for labor. Effort input becomes a demand-
side shift parameter in the behavioral model.  
One can also derive an effort labor supply curve building on the standard labor supply 
curve, which relates wage rate to the supply of hours of labor. In this case, effort supply is 
given by hours supply scaled by effort input per hour of labor supplied. This is illustrated in 
Diagram 4a. S1 assumes that effort input is inelastic to changes in wages. So, S1 is given by 
hours of labor supplied per wage rate scaled by a fixed amount of effort per hour supplied—
this is standard assumption. S2 assumes that effort increases with wages. In this case, S2 
pivots outward as wages increase. This assumes that workers work harder and smarter as 
wages increase—the behavioral assumption. 
8 Efficiency Wage and X-efficiency Theory 
 Efficiency wage theory was originally formulated by Leibenstein (1957) to explain 
persistent unemployment in less development economies. It specifies that there is a unique 
profit-maximizing wage (the efficiency wage), yielding a unique profit maximizing level of 
effort input per unit of labor input. This was partially based on the argument that if wages 
were cut at low levels of nutrition, workers effort input would collapse, cutting into firm 
profits. Thus, rational decision-makers, maintain wages above their market-clearing rate, 
yielding persistent voluntary unemployment.  
Akerlof’s contemporary rendering of efficiency wage theory, makes the case for an 
above market-clearing unique efficiency wage, constructed by rational decision-makers, for 
social and psychological as opposed nutrition-related reasons. These include, social norms or 
fairness, reciprocity, moral sentiment, insider power, asymmetric information, and employers’ 
fear of retaliation by employees for perceived unfair treatment (Akerlof 2002; Akerlof, 
Dickens, Perry 1996, 2000; Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Bewley 1999).  
 Pioneered by theory Leibenstein (1966, 1979), x-efficiency theory offers a richer 
more nuanced modeling of effort variability, one that can be used to better explain issues such 
as involuntary unemployment as well as sub-optimal economic performance in terms of per 
capita output and in terms of unit costs and profitability. X-inefficiency is traditionally 
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defined as output being less than it can potentially be given factor inputs and technology. This 
sub-optimal level of output is a function of the quantity and quality of effort being inputted 
into the production process than would be the case under best practice industrial relations and 
competitive (product market) environment. In terms of efficiency wage theory, a wage lower 
than the efficiency wage would yield x-inefficiency in production. 
In the original specification of x-efficiency theory Leibenstein focuses on effort 
variability of management and owners. Ceteris paribus, reducing the quality and quantity of 
managerial effort increases unit production costs, by reducing firm productivity, making the 
firm less competitive, unless protected from competitive pressures. Such reductions in firm 
productivity would also have the effect of reducing the firm’s demand for labor shifting 
inward the firm’s market demand curve. In this modeling scenario, firm decision-makers, 
members of the firm hierarchy, might very well be maximizing their utility by reducing their 
effort levels below some reasonable potential high. But to sustain x-inefficiency in production 
the firm must be operating in an imperfect product market environment or obtain protection 
or support from government to survive as high cost firms. Or, such firms can survive if there 
are firms that are no more x-efficient (lower average cost) in the market.12  
One way of illustrating this particular take on labor supply is in terms of a very 
simple economy where labor is the only costed input (Altman 2005). 
1.    
where AC is average cost, w is the wage rate and (Q/L) is the average product of labor, Q is 
total output, and L is labor input measured in terms of hours worked. If managerial effort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Simon	  (1987,	  p.	  223)	  makes	  the	  point:	  “In	  the	  biological	  world	  at	  least,	  many	  organisms	  survive	  that	  are	  not	  maximizers	  but	  that	  operate	  at	  far	  less	  than	  the	  highest	  achievable	  efficiency.	  Their	  survival	  is	  not	  threatened	  as	  long	  as	  no	  other	  organisms	  have	  evolved	  that	  can	  challenge	  the	  possession	  of	  their	  specific	  niches.	  Analogously,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  every	  business	  firm	  is	  challenged	  by	  an	  optimally	  efficient	  competitor,	  survival	  only	  requires	  meeting	  the	  competition.	  In	  a	  system	  in	  which	  there	  are	  innumerable	  rents,	  of	  long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  duration,	  even	  egregious	  sub-­‐optimality	  may	  permit	  survival.”	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input is reduced, firm productivity falls and this yields, ceteris paribus, higher average costs. 
Of course, increasing effort levels increases firm productivity, thereby reducing average costs. 
In a more complex model where labor is not the only input in the production function, the 
implications of varying effort inputs remain the same (see, for example, Altman 2006a). But 
in this case, increasing the wage rate only increases average cost by less than the percentage 
increase in wages. So, for example, if labor comprises 50 percent of input costs, a 10 percent 
increase in wages only increases average cost by 5 percent (50 percent of 10 percent) as 
opposed to 10 percent. In this model, the competitively sustainable minimum effort levels are 
given by the extent to which x-inefficient firms are protected from competitive pressures. 
One of the key predictions from this model is that more competitive markets yield, 
ceteris paribus, higher levels of x-efficiency. This would increase the demand for labor. 
Competitive pressures force firm decision-makers into increasing their effort levels, even if 
this higher level is not preferred. This, however, might end up being an unstable equilibrium 
with regards to the higher effort levels forthcoming firm decision-makers if their preferences 
for lower effort levels remain stable. Therefore, if environmental constraints change and are 
relaxed, one would predict a reversion to lower levels of effort and higher levels of x-
inefficiency. Another prediction flowing from this model, is that firms (members of the firm 
hierarchy) invest in sheltering activity in an attempt to preserve an institutional environment 
where they can choose lower levels of effort input thereby increasing their level of utility at 
the cost to the firm and society of higher average costs and lower levels of x-efficiency.   
 But x-efficiency theory speaks to a much broader spectrum of labor effort supply than 
simply the supply of managerial (or decision-makers’) effort. Leibenstein (1982) introduces 
the multi-agent firm, where conflict and conflict resolution in the context of cultural and 
institutional variables (inclusive of power relationships across agents) play a key role in 
determining the levels of effort levels supplied across agents to the firm. Leibenstein regards 
the determinants of principle-agent related x-inefficiency as analogous to a potential 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type problem that can only be resolved by changing the industrial 
relations system—injecting trust, honesty, fairness, transparency, legal recourse to conflict 
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resolution, and conventions into the system—so that agents make choices consistent with 
Golden Rule or maximum x-efficiency outcomes. Cooperation and trust across agents is the 
penultimate solution to maximizing the effort dimension of labor supply whilst minimizing 
various transaction costs related to effort monitoring (Leibenstein 1978; 1982, pp. 92-94; 
1983). The alternative, adversarial method of managing the firm incentivizes agents to veer 
towards the low productivity solution (Nash equilibrium) to the firm-based Prisoners’ 
Dilemma problem.13  
In a more generalized behavioral model of effort-related labor supply and x-
efficiency (Altman (1992, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001b, 2002), unlike in the efficiency wage 
literature, the wage rate is only one determinant of effort as part the overall system of 
industrial relations. X-efficiency is maximized given the appropriate mix and level of material 
and nonmaterial incentives, although material incentives are typically quite important. 
Increasing x-efficiency can be a product of voluntary cooperation across agents to maximize 
output and economic payoffs to workers and members of the firm hierarchy. Or it can be a 
product to shocks to the system such as increasing wages and improved working conditions or 
increased competitive pressures that force firm decision-makers as well as agents (workers) to 
revolve Prisoner Dilemma-type problems so as to remain competitive given the new binding 
constraints facing the firm. 
Unlike with efficiency wage theory, with a unique equilibrium wage, this behavioral 
model allows for multiple equilibria with regards to the wage and the overall compensation 
package and work environment. There is a wide array of levels of labor compensation 
consistent with some unique unit cost of production. Average unit cost is inelastic with 
respect to changes in the level of x-efficiency if productivity increases are just offset by 
changes in the level labor compensation, inclusive of the costs related to changes in the work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Leibenstein	  argues:	  “The	  main	  general	  point	  is	  that	  merely	  obtaining	  an	  acquiescent	  nonshirking	  effort	  is	  of	  limited	  value.	  Freely	  offered	  effort,	  inclusive	  of	  attentiveness	  and	  caring	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  effort,	  in	  return	  for	  what	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  good	  deal	  (in	  the	  long	  run)	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  higher	  productivity.”	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environment. Increasing wages, for example, need not increase unit cost, while cutting wages 
need not reduce unit cost. For this reason, changes in the rate of labor compensation need not 
effect the competitive position of the firm. More specifically, increasing the level of x-
inefficiency need not make a firm less competitive, whilst reducing the level of x-inefficiency 
need not make a firm more competitive. More or less competition need not affect the level of 
x-inefficiency in this behavioral model, since changes in the level of x-inefficiency need not 
affect average cost. Cost minimizing firms, can choose from a relatively large set of wage 
rates (or more comprehensively, compensation packages and work environments), contingent 
on the preferences of firm decision-makers and the power relationships across agents, for 
example.  Therefore, in this model there is no unique efficiency wage that must be chosen by 
rational cost minimizing, profit maximizing decision-makers. This behavioral model provides 
an analytical framework that allows for the persistence of x-efficiency under different 
competitive environments as well for multiple equilibria in terms of levels of x-efficiency and 
in-firm conventions. In this model, product markets can even be perfectly competitive or at 
least contestable. Moreover, wages can vary across firms without there being any difference 
in average costs. But if wages and compensation packages do vary, then there must be a 
compensating variation in effort inputs related to such variations in systems of industrial 
relations.  
This type of effort related labor supply modeling can help explain how and why firms 
and economies with different wage rates and working conditions can persist over time and, 
related to this point, how x-inefficient firms can persist over time. The survival of the fittest 
(or the most x-efficient) does not hold when changes effort inputs compensate for changes in 
labor costs. Decision-makers can choose a utility maximizing combination of x-inefficiency 
and wages and working conditions that maximize their utility. An x-inefficient utility 
maximizing choice for firm managers and owners can be consistent competitive average costs 
and profits, but could be well below the x-efficient level of production and could yield 
relatively low levels of utility or wellbeing to the firms’ workers. In terms of the demand for 
labor, when labor costs changes are just offset by changes in productivity, there would be no 
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change in the demand for labor as wages change, since shift in the demand curve just offsets 
changes in labor compensation. 
Some of the points are illustrated in Diagram 5. In the standard approach, given the 
assumptions being made about effort variability, any increase in wages or improvements to 
working conditions generates an increase in average cost. Any decrease in the value of these 
variables result in a drop average cost. This is given by ACW. The slop of this curve is 
determined by production function parameters. The efficiency wage story is illustrated by 
curve EW. There exists some unique wage, W1, that yields a unique minimum average cost at 
A, given by e1. Any wage that differs from the efficiency wage generates a higher average 
cost. No rational cost-minimizing firm would choose a wage that differs from the efficiency 
wage, in this case, W1. The more general behavioral (x-efficiency) narrative is illustrated by 
curve BM. As wages increase or fall from a to e5, there are no changes to average cost. There 
exists some horizontal constant cost linearity to this particular average cost function. This is 
based on the assumptions being made with regards to the causal relationship between wages, 
overall working conditions, industrial relations, effort inputs, and productivity. After a certain 
point, effort increases with regard to increases in costs, hit a wall of seriously diminishing 
returns and the behavioral narrative and cost curve reverts to the standard one wherein 
increases in wages and related costs generate increasing average costs. Output consistent with 
wage W3 would be consistent with the Golden Rule outcome or solution to the productivity 
problem. In this case, the pie size is maximized. On the other hand, at wage W0, for example, 
pie size is much smaller and one is veering towards a Prisoner’s Dilemma solution to the 
productivity problem. In the behavioral model, the constraint of higher wages can also be 
predicted to incentivize technological change shifting the cost curve from BM to BMTC, 
allowing wages higher than W3 to be consistent the competitive and prior average cost of 0A 
(Altman 2009).  
Further to the behavioral model, there are short terms costs involved in either 
increasing or decreasing the wage rate. This is given by FD or e1B. This is one reason that 
efficiency wage scholars find the nominal wage rate is sticky downward over the business 
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cycle (Bewley1999). Also, improving efficiency as wages increase involves short term costs, 
which can deter firms from engaging in higher wage-x-efficient strategies on their own 
(utility maximizing) volition, given trust levels and the uncertainty of future outcomes.  
9 Some Labor Market Implications of Generalized X-Efficiency Theory 
X-efficiency theory provides some insight into the observed effect of minimum 
wages and unions upon employment. The standard economics’ prediction is that these 
variables will negatively affect the economy by reducing employment—making the marginal 
workers unemployable—and by making firms less competitive by increasing their average 
cost. To the extent that increasing wages, from minimum wage legislation or through 
collective bargaining, induces more effort and, thereby, productivity offsets to the increased 
labor costs, the predicted negative effects of minimum wages and unions need not transpire. It 
is even possible that minimum wage and union-type shocks to the economy might increase 
productivity to such an extent that employment actually increases. The extent or size of the 
productivity offsets is an empirical question. In Diagram 5, increasing wages, up to a point 
(such as from W0 to W3), does not increase average cost and do not make firms less 
competitive.  
In the standard model, increasing minimum wages (or even introducing minimum 
wages) or allowing unions to increase wages from some theoretical market clearing norm, 
causes employment to fall and labor supply to increase. In Diagram 6, the increase in the 
wage rate from W1 to WMWUN, yields an excess supply of labor, LEFL0. However, to the extent 
there is a x-efficiency effect of increasing the wage, the labor demand curve (based on 
marginal product curve) shifts outward from LBD to LGD or to LCD, for example. In latter case, 
the labor market would clear at c, but at a higher level of employment. In the former case, 
there remains an excess supply of labor, only because one is assuming that more individuals 
are attracted onto the labor market by the increase in the wage rate. But the induced increased 
labor productivity restores employment to its prior level of L1. The extent to which the labor 
demand curve shifts outward is an empirical question. A similar argument can be made with 
respect to the impact of labor unions on the labor market. The evidence supports such a shift 
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in the labor demand curve. (Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Card 
and Krueger 1995; Kaufman 2010; Reich, Jacobs, and Dietz 2014). 
The flip side of this argument relates to the implications of wage cuts that might be a 
function of introducing rules and regulations that drive wages below the market-clearing 
wage in the context of standard supply and demand analyses (Altman 2006a, 2006b). If such 
low wages can be maintained for institutional reasons, the standard model predicts that the 
supply of market labor falls and the demand for market labor increases along the respective 
supply and demand curves. But if this cut in wages has a negative impact on the supply effort 
per unit of labor, the demand curve for labor (based on marginal product curve) shifts inward, 
yielding a new but low wage equilibrium, with less employment than when wages are higher. 
This point is illustrated in Diagram 6, with the initial labor market equilibrium at c; with 
demand LCD and labor supply LSFR. The wage rate drops to W0 for institutional reasons 
leading to an excess supply of labor (ag or L0L3). The new labor supply curve is given by 
LSUNFR. But the x-efficiency effect of the lower wage is to reduce effort inputs thereby 
reducing labor productivity, shifting the labor demand curve inward to LAD. And the market 
now clears at, a, at the lower wage W0 yielding employment L0. 
This particular behavioral model of effort labor supply also casts some light on the 
efficiency wage theory of involuntary unemployment (Altman 2006a, 2006b). Efficiency 
wage theory relies upon the assumption that there is a unique efficiency wage that yields an 
excess supply for labor—it is too high to clear the labor market (Akerlof 2002; Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Perry 1996, 2000; Bewley 1999). But, to the extent that there is no unique 
efficiency wage, involuntary unemployment can be resolved from the supply side to the 
extent that relatively high wages are compensated for by relatively high levels of labor 
productivity and, therefore, higher levels of x-efficiency. Simply put, in the efficiency wage 
literature, there would be an efficiency wage given by WMWUN, for example, in Diagram 6. 
This wage rate is too high to clear the labor market at L1 and is, therefore, a supply side 
impediment to increasing employment. But the efficiency wage is given by rational cost 
minimizing-profit maximizing considerations. Cutting the wage to W1 wouldn’t work since 
	   35	  
workers would reduce their effort inputs as a consequence, shifting the labor demand curve to 
the left, to LAD, keeping employment at its prior low level.  
This leads efficiency wage economists such as Akerlof and Fehr to posit that fairness 
considerations can generate excess levels of unemployment. One solution to this problem of 
the downward sticky real (and nominal) wage is to find a way of reducing the real wage 
whilst avoiding the predicted negative efficiency wage effect.  This can occur if one assumes 
money illusion; that workers are quasi-rational and won’t respond to mild inflation induced 
cuts to real wages (for transaction-cognitive costs reasons). In this case, the labor market 
clears at b at wage rate W1, along labor demand curve LBD. The labor demand curve does not 
shift inward, since effort inputs do not change as the real wage falls with mild inflation, for 
reasons of money illusion (Akerlof 2002; Akerlof, Dickens, Perry 1996; 2000). This 
reintroduces the traditional long run Phillips Curve wherein there is a long run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment—more inflation yields more employment and thereby 
lower rates of unemployment. 
However, the behavioral-x-efficiency model suggests that money illusion is not 
required to restore full employment (Altman 2006b). This is consistent with the vertical, 
inelastic, Philips Curve—there need not be a long run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment (Friedman 1968).  Rather, if the higher wage WMWUN is associated with a 
higher level of x-efficiency such that the labor demand curve associated with this wage rate is 
LCD, the labor market clears at c and with LEF employment. If there is some linearity with 
regards to the wage-average cost relationship, then higher wage can yield the cost offsets 
necessary to allow the labor market to clear at the higher wage rates. Higher wages need not 
be the obstacle to ‘full’ employment suggested by standard economic theory and by the 
efficiency wage literature.  
This point is further illustrated in Diagram 7. Assume that full employment is given 
by N2 and W2, in the standard model, given by marginal product of labor curve MP2. The 
market clears at e2. Efficiency wage theory assumes a market distorting efficiency wage of 
W1 and an equilibrium at e*.  Employment is at N1, below full employment. Decreasing the 
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wage to W2 is assumed to generate a reduction in effort inputs such that the marginal product 
curve shifts inward to MP3. In this case, decreasing the wage rate does not have the standard 
predicted effect of increasing employment. Only if workers are subject to money illusion will 
the marginal product curve be invariant to changes in the wage rate, allowing for full 
employment to be achieved by cutting real wages. But if increasing the wage rate from w2 to 
w1 yields a x-efficiency effect of shifting the marginal product curve upwards to MP1, full 
employment is obtained at N2 at the higher wage rate. The high wage x-efficiency full 
employment equilibrium is obtained at e1.  
This is consistent with the evidence that across countries there is a positive 
relationship between wage rates and employment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald 1995). 
There need not be a strict labor market constraint preventing the realization of full 
employment where the extent of x-efficiency is a function of the wages rate, working 
conditions, and system of industrial relations. Seeking means to increase productivity by 
increasing the extent of x-efficiency and induced technological change is a plausible supply-
side alternative to increase employment in contrast to the traditional focus on cutting real 
wages. 	  
10 Conclusion 
Behaviorial models of labor markets are informed by how decision-making is 
affected by psychological, sociological, and institutional variables. A common concern of 
behavioral economists is that there are all too many empirical occurrences that are 
inconsistent with key elements of standard labor economic theory. As well, standard labor 
economics can’t explain all too many labor market phenomenon. To better explain labor 
market behavior and outcomes requires revisiting and revising some key simplifying 
modeling assumptions that are the mainstay of standard labor market theory.  
In this chapter, I focus on three key areas where behavioral economics provides 
considerable theoretical insight. One area is the determinants of labor supply. This brings us 
to a discussion of a target theory of labor supply. Target income and target non-labor time in 
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the context of an individual’s hierarchy of wants play a key role in explaining labor supply, in 
contrast to the standard theory’s focus on the income and substitution effects. Secondly, the 
importance of the multi-dimensional nature of labor supply with regards to effort variability is 
discussed. I pay critical attention to the fact that labor supply consists not only time but effort 
as well. This contrasts with the standard view that effort inputs are fixed. Introducing effort 
variability impacts one’s understanding of the demand side of the labor market through its 
impact on labor productivity. Related to this, it also impacts one’s understanding of 
involuntary unemployment as well as the implications of unions and minimum wages for 
employment and efficiency.  
I also discuss the analytical and public policy insights behavioral economics provide 
into what many behavioral economists argue are errors and biases in decision-making with 
regards to the labor market issues. These are said to produce inefficient labor market 
outcomes for the individual and for society at large. And, it has the effect of shifting the labor 
supply curve inward. In the standard modeling individuals are assumed to be calculating and 
omniscient, not subject to errors or biases in decision-making. Decisions are assumed to be 
optimal and not subject to regret. Other behavioral economists, coming from the bounded 
approach, often identify inefficient and sub-optimal decision-making as a product of rational 
or smart decisions that are product of the constraints individuals face, inclusive of 
psychological, sociological, and institutional constraints.  
Each school of behavioral economics, based on different methodological approaches 
to decision-making, proffers different solutions to correct for inefficient decision-making 
outcomes. If one assumes that individuals are fundamentally error-prone and biased then it 
become critical to de-bias decision-making. The alternative is to induce or force individuals to 
behave in a manner that’s inconsistent with their preferences, but which is consistent with 
optimality and efficiency from the perspective of the expert.  
If one assumes that individuals are largely rational and un-biased but sometimes do 
make error-prone decisions or decisions that are not optimal socially or even from the 
perspective of the decision-maker, the public policy focus is on changing the incentive and 
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information environment and on changing the capabilities of the decision-makers. This stands 
a good chance of inducing and facilitating choices that are more in line with individuals’ own 
self-interest and that of society at large.  
Both approaches to behavioral economics recognize and identify the gaps in the 
standard approaches to the labor market modeling. Both approaches also have implications 
for understanding both the supply and demand sides of the labor markets. Behavioral 
dimensions to decision-making, rational or not, affect our understanding of how much labor is 
supplied on the market as well as the determinants of labor productivity, which impacts on the 
demand side of the market. Behavioral economics thereby enriches the price and income–
focused traditional economic toolbox, generating alternative hypotheses to be tested and 
public policy designs to be evaluated. 
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